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This study explores the varieties of East Asian developmentalist trade policy by analyzing 
Thailand’s and South Korea’s pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs). Thailand and South Korea 
offer a nice laboratory to test a ‘neoliberal vs. developmental’ perspective. After Prime Minister 
Thaksin took office in 2001, Thailand became a pacesetter in East Asia’s pursuit of FTAs with its 
policy nexus of developmentalism and liberalism. However, the lack of institutionalization of trade 
policy-making process soon led Thaksin’s CEO-style leadership and pro-business policy bias to 
cronyism and corruption. In contrast to Thailand’s abrupt move from developmental liberalism to 
sectoral cronyism, South Korea has successfully institutionalized its transition from developmental 
mercantilism to developmental liberalism by strengthening the key trade agency—i.e., the Office of the 
Minister for Trade, which successfully embedded its industrial policy goals in liberal trade initiatives.  
 






In East Asia, the post-1997-98 Asian financial crisis (AFC) consensus was that the result 
of globalization is a growing convergence of national economic policies toward neo-
liberalism. The traditional functions provided by nation-states have either shifted to the other 
non-state actors or disappeared (completely) under the pressure of globalization. The 
developmental state model became the main target of blame for the birth of crony capitalism 
and the forced divorce of the state and market (Chang, 2007; Dittmer, 2007; Ha and Lee, 
2007; Krugman, 1994; Lee and Han, 2007).  
Yet, the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis of 2010 have induced serious skepticism of neoliberal policy prescriptions. In 
response, government interventionism, either in the form of quantitative easing or industrial 
policy to rescue troubled businesses, has expanded across the world. The GFC indeed opened 
the renewed debate about the role of state in development and trade. Industrial policy is now 
back in fashion in major economies such as the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, 
China, and South Korea (The Economist August 7
th
, 2010). There is a growing lacuna in the 
literature on post-crisis capitalism in East Asia. An emerging consensus is that globalization 
has not undermined the legitimacy of developmentalist trade policy (Dittmer, 2007; Joshi, 
2012; Lim, 2010; Stubbs, 2009). 
East Asian countries’ pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) is set against this 
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‘neoliberal vs. developmental’ pendulum. Among export-dependent East Asian countries, the 
need grew rapidly to pursue greater institutionalization of trade ties beyond the linkages 
traditionally provided by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), on the one hand, and ethnic Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. 
corporate networks, on the other (Aggarwal and Koo, 2005, 2008).
1
 
Do East Asian countries remain autonomous and central in setting industrial and trade 
policy goals in the post-AFC and post-GFC period? Thailand and South Korea offer a nice 
laboratory to examine the rise and fall of developmentalist trade policy in East Asia. The tale 
of Thailand and South Korea is particularly intriguing as they share similarities and 
differences in their pursuit of FTAs, thus helping understand better the varieties of 
developmentalist trade policy in the region. 
Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Thailand was a highly open, globally-integrated 
economy thanks to significant unilateral liberalization. In the aftermath of the AFC, Thailand 
maintained its liberal approach toward trade. As the Thaksin administration took office in 
2001, FTAs became a serious policy bias as developmentalist goals were combined with 
liberal trade policy orientation (Nagai, 2002; Sally, 2007). In many respects, Thailand was 
thought to be the pacesetter in the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia. Despite its earlier 
enthusiasm and success, however, Thailand’s FTA initiative along with its developmentalist 
goals is now in stalemate. 
In contrast, South Korea, which used to be criticized for its allegedly protectionist 
policies, remains a steady player in the FTA game and has successfully embedded its 
industrial policy goals in its liberal trade initiatives. South Korea has led the race toward 
bilateral FTAs since its first cross-Pacific free trade deal with Chile in 2003. The GFC has 
not reduced the speed and scope of South Korea’s FTA initiative. It is the only country that 
has concluded bilateral FTAs with four major economies among its top five trading partners: 
the U.S., the EU, ASEAN, and China (Koo, 2009, 2010, 2013). If fully implemented, over 67 
percent of South Korea’s total trade would be covered by the fourteen bilateral FTAs that 
have been concluded so far.  
The evolution of FTA strategies in both countries needs to be understood in light of the 
way in which domestic structures have underpinned such a dramatic shift under the rubric of 
free trade. The developmental state debate provides a natural starting point for a comparative 
analysis of the rise and fall of government-led FTA strategies (Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cumings, 
1999). From an analytical point of view, the significance of this comparative analysis is 
three-fold. First, the two countries represent a notable policy departure from the exclusive 
focus on the postwar multilateral trading regime and shift toward ‘government-led’ trade 
liberalization through FTAs. Second, their FTA strategies have been shaped by a top-down 
political initiative rather than a bottom-up demand from business groups and the general 
public. And third, however, Thailand’s trade policy has devolved into sectoral cronyism, 
whereas South Korea maintains a sustainable mix of developmentalism and liberalism.  
The remainder of this study unfolds as follows. Building upon the developmental state 
approach, Section II develops a conceptual framework to examine how a particular set of 
arrangements between government’s industrial policy and the scope of trade liberalization 
                                                          
1 As the trend-setting East Asian only Japan-Singapore Agreement for New Age Economic Partnership 
was agreed to in October 2001, others soon followed, with accords including South Korea and Chile 
(2003), Japan and Mexico (2004), and the like. By 2014 the number of FTAs concluded by East Asian 
countries is over 100. See ADB database at http://www.aric.adb.org/. 




has affected each country’s trade policy equilibrium. Sections III and IV analyze how and to 
what extent Thailand and South Korea have embedded sectoral cronyism and developmental 
liberalism, respectively, in their FTA initiatives, departing from their earlier focus on market-
based liberalism (Thailand) and developmental mercantilism (South Korea). Section V 
summarizes the main argument and findings and draws broad regional implications. 
 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE VARIETIES OF DEVELOPMENTALIST 
TRADE POLICY 
 




As one of the most compelling explanations for East Asia’s economic catch-up, the 
developmental state model challenged a variety of widely accepted models of economic 
development, from the plan-irrational socialist model to liberal modernization. The adherents 
of the ‘plan-rational’ developmental state model argue that a certain type of interventionist 
government is capable of transforming a poor, underdeveloped country into a prosperous one. 
It is widely held that East Asian countries have been generally more successful than their 
counterparts in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, because the formers have acquired 
control over a variety of factors critical to economic growth such as capital, national 
economic planning, scarce resources, industrial policies, and political insulation (Amsden, 
1989; Johnson, 1982; Pempel, 1999; Wade, 1990; Woo-Cumings, 1999). 
However, the so-called convergence thesis poses a direct challenge to the East Asian 
developmental state model, in which state autonomy is particularly crucial. The convergence 
thesis claims that the authority of the governments of all states, large and small, strong and 
weak, has been eroding rapidly as a result of globalization: The more a national economy is 
integrated into global markets, the higher the costs of a national policy that is not compatible 
with global market demands such as deregulation and market liberalization. In a world of 
highly integrated economies, owners of capital, highly skilled workers, and many 
professionals are highly mobile and can take their resources where they are most in demand. 
Anticipating this flight of capital and skills, governments have to cut taxes and dismantle the 
welfare state before the migration gets under way. The result is a growing convergence of 
national economic policies toward neoclassical liberalism and trade liberalization (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Strange, 1996). 
Following the unprecedented economic success of the previous decades, the late 1990s 
provided a painful litmus test for the validity and utility of East Asia’s developmental state 
model. In the wake of the AFC, the illusion of the East Asian economic miracle was 
shattered. The developmental state model was now called corrupt crony capitalism, 
vulnerable to moral hazards. The imposed solution, in the so-called Washington Consensus, 
was transparency in corporate governance and retreat of the state (Sohn, 2013). Many 
predicted that a convergence toward the Anglo-American liberal market economies would be 
inevitable when it came to corporate governance, at the center of which was the fad for 
marketization and financialization (Dore, 2000). More importantly, many Western countries, 
particularly the U.S., became less tolerant of East Asian countries’ mercantilist policy. Under 
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bibliography. 
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the rubric of fair trade or the level playing field, the U.S. aggressively demanded an 




Despite their respective explanatory strengths, neither the traditional developmental state 
model nor the neoliberal convergence theory can fully capture the post-crisis East Asian 
developmental states that have varied both spatially and temporally. The developmental state 
approach can explain why relatively autonomous interventionist governments persist in some 
parts of the region. However, this approach falls short of accounting for why some countries 
liberalize trade more comprehensively than others who tend to stick to mercantilist policies. 
In contrast, the neoliberal approach can explain the trade liberalization in some countries, but 
remains silent about why government elites still retain relative autonomy in other countries. 
In what follows, this study develops a synthetic framework that can consider the different 
types of combinations between developmentalism and liberalism. 
 
2.2 Developmentalism-liberalism Nexus 
 
When negotiating trade agreements, individual countries choose the characteristics of 
agreements and have differing preferences in two dimensions: (1) the range of issues that 
agreements deals with, running from narrow to broad; and (2) the intention of the 
participating governments, ranging from interventionist or laissez-faire.
4
  
First, in terms of the range of issues, many countries have pursued sectoral, narrow-based 
negotiations to open markets. Such negotiations were especially preferred by the U.S. in the 
mid- and late 1990s. The U.S. government negotiated sectoral agreements in telecom-
munications, information technology, and financial services. Most of America’s East Asian 
trading partners were also drawn into this direction. In contrast to comprehensive 
liberalization, sectoral agreements may raise trade barriers, as in the case of the Multi-fiber 
Arrangement (MFA), which had taken the world down the elaborate protectionist path in 
textiles until it phased out in 2005. In the meantime, moderate, sectoral protection is 
sometimes considered as the price that has to be paid for the greater good of comprehensive 
liberalization, because it helps pacify powerful anti-free trade coalitions (Aggarwal and 
Ravenhill, 2001).  
The issue scope of trade liberalization—whether narrow/sectoral or broad/comprehensive 
—can be brokered by the degree of interventionist goals promoted by an autonomous 
government. In contrast to the neoliberal emphasis on benefiting corporate businesses by 
minimizing the role of the state, the developmental state literature emphasizes the 
                                                          
3  ‘Asymmetric reciprocity’ advantageously opens markets for U.S. traders and investors, while 
rewarding and supporting domestic market-oriented reformers and advancing democratic institutions, 
an agenda that the Bush administration began to pursue at the turn of the new millennium (Feinberg, 
2003). For the interplay of free trade and fair trade ideas in American trade policy decision-making, 
see Goldstein 1988. 
4  Of course, there are other characteristics that individual countries will have to choose when 
negotiating trade agreements: (1) actor scope, which refers to whether the agreement is bilateral or 
multilateral; (2) geography, which refers to whether the agreements are focused within or outside the 
region; (3) the size of partners, large or small; and (4) the institutional strength of the arrangement 
being negotiated (Aggarwal, 1998). However, the two dimensions—issue scope and industrial policy 
goal orientation—illustrate the most notably variations among East Asian countries.  




government’s ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans, 1995)
5
 and the importance of strategic and 
‘selective state intervention’ (Grabowski, 1994: 413). The government’s ability to “discipline 
firms which break the rules, and also prevent people with money from hijacking the political 
process” (Gainsborough, 2009: 1319) has been thought to be a key to success. This requires 
strong state capacity to penetrate and transform society by overcoming narrow interest 
groups and reactionary elites. This is made possible through state control over both the 
mobilization and allocation of scarce resources under the guidance of politically insulated 
technocrats in the civil service (Haggard, 1990; Joshi, 2012; Migdal, 1988; Wade, 1990).  
Most importantly, social embeddedness of industrial policy has allowed the develop-
mental states to catch two pigeons with one bean: promoting competitive export industries 
while pacifying less competitive sectors. South Korea in the 1970s and the 1980s was the 
best example (Lee, 2011; Sohn, 2006). When combined with the autonomous develop-
mentalist trade policy, embeddedness allows states to go beyond welfare states as defined by 
the traditional ‘embedded liberalism’ literature (Koo, 2010). 
The nexus between developmentalism (industrial policy goals) and liberalism (issue 
scope of trade liberalization) can be categorized as follows:  
First, developmental mercantilism/sectoralism refers to the characteristics of trade 
liberalization with a strong industrial policy goal orientation in narrow issue areas. The ideal 
type of this category can be found in the Japanese developmental strategy in the 1960s and 
the 1970s that centered on rapid growth through domestic protection, industrial policy, and 
export promotion. Pempel (1998: 5-10) characterizes such trade policies as ‘embedded 
mercantilism.’  
Second, market-based sectoralism or sectoral cronyism refers to the characteristics of 
trade liberalization with a weak industrial policy goal orientation and a narrow issue scope. 
As Aggarwal and Ravenhill (2001) note, sectoral and narrow-based trade negotiations to 
open markets can lead to both positive and negative consequences. On a positive side, it can 
eventually facilitate comprehensive trade liberalization by working on narrower but easier 
issues first (market-based sectoralism). On a negative side, it can ultimately sap the political 
momentum needed to reach an over-arching multilateral agreement (sectoral cronyism).  
Third, developmental liberalism refers to the characteristic of trade liberalization with a 
strong industrial policy goal orientation in broad issue areas. The institutional marriage of 
developmentalism and liberalism may sound like an oxymoron. However, they can be 
compatible with each other to the extent that top-down, government-led market opening 
efforts through FTAs can promote competitive export industries while pacifying less 
competitive sectors with generous side payments. Here developmentalism is brokered by the 
social embeddedness of industrial and trade policies. Under the competitive pressure of 
globalization, no country can escape from the formidable market force if it wishes to secure  
                                                          
5 Peter Evans uses the term ‘embedded autonomy’ to demonstrate that successful developmental states 
in East Asia tend to be immersed in a dense network of ties that bind them to groups or classes that 
can become allies in the pursuit of societal goals. According to Evans, embeddedness provides 
sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. In 
his logic, therefore, the idea of the state as midwife comes to the fore: States foster industry by 
changing social structures and by assisting in the emergence of new social groups and interests (Evans, 
1995). From this viewpoint, the impressive institutional constructions that went with embedded 
autonomy in South Korea are contrasted to the often inconsistent state efforts by Brazil and India to 
generate local entrepreneurial groups in the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Table 1. Industrial Policy and Trade Liberalization Nexus 
 














the benefit of international trade. Unlike the traditional multilateral mechanism of the 
GATT/WTO, FTAs between partners of unequal or asymmetric bargaining powers often 
make it less likely that one partner will get a free ride on the other’s market, as illustrated by 
substantial concessions given by South Korea and Mexico to the U.S. to conclude an FTA. 
Nevertheless, there is a room for individual governments to maneuver to promote priority 
sectors and to compensate for the losses inflicted on uncompetitive sectors (Koo, 2010). 
Fourth, market-based liberalism refers to the characteristic of trade agreements with a 
weak industrial policy goal orientation and a broad issue scope. This category is equivalent 
to the neoliberal view that states should not have a vertical or sectoral industrial policy, as 
opposed to a horizontal or genuinely interventionist policy and that trade liberalization 
should include ‘substantially’ all the trade. Table 1 summarizes this categorization.  
 
 
3. THAILAND: MOVING FROM MARKET-BASED LIBERALISM TO SECTORAL 
CRONYISM 
 
3.1 The Rise and Fall of Market-based Liberalism 
 
In the early 1970s, Thailand shifted its trade policy platform from import-substitution to 
export-oriented strategy. Fueled by a large amount of capital inflows, labor-intensive 
industries transformed Thai’s once predominantly agricultural economy into a manufacturing 
one.
6
 Before the AFC, Thailand remained as a highly open and globally integrated economy, 
as indicated by its pursuit of non-discriminatory unilateral liberalization under the 
GATT/WTO regime (Kwon, 2003; Sally, 2007). The volume of merchandise trade amounted 
to over 80 percent of Thai’s GDP in 1997. For a decade before entering the AFC, Thai 
economy grew about 10 percent each year (Bank of Thailand, 1998).  
Having taken over the power to cope with the AFC, the Chuan Leekpai administration 
(1997-2001) carried out a series of internal economic reforms under the guidance of the IMF. 
It also maintained the trade policy orientation that had been formed around the market-based 
liberalism since Thailand joined the GATT in 1982. Chuan and his cohorts, especially 
Commerce Minister Supachai Panitchpakdi, strongly believed that expanding export and FDI 
                                                          
6 The share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in national income decreased from 47 percent in 1950 
to 10 percent in 1990, while that of manufacturing sectors increasing from 23 percent in 1986 to 35 
percent in 2001. See the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board at 
http://www.nsedb.go.th/. 




would be crucial for the recovery of Thai economy. They lifted a wide range of regulations 
on businesses and offered various incentives to foreign investors (Sen and Sally, 2005). 
However, the reform programs under Chuan lost their appeal as they inherently featured 
IMF’s bailout programs. Chuan’s recovery programs were too biased towards the financial 
and monetary sectors, only to cause unintended side effects such as increasing government 
debts, income inequality and corruption scandals. The GDP growth rate fell from 4.4 percent 
in 1999 to 2.2 percent in 2001. The Chuan administration failed to garner the support from 
the common Thais, especially the low and middle classes. Rapidly rising prices of imported 
goods, induced by Baht’s devaluation by over 50 percent, caused public resentments 
(Thitinan and Sally, 2008; Thitinan, 2011). 
The plight of the common Thai eventually set off revenge votes against the ruling party 
in the 2001 general election, leading the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party led by a business tycoon 
Thaksin Shinawatra to win a landslide victory. Upon taking the office in 2001, Prime 
Minister Thaksin launched the so-called Thaksinomics (Pran, 2004). TRT’s parliamentary 
majority provided Thaksinomics with stable political foundations.
7
 During the earlier period 
of his tenure, Thaksin confidently exercised his leadership in pursuing fundamental 
economic reforms. On the one hand, he implemented a fiscal stimulus package to relieve the 
economic problems of the have-nots in urban and rural areas, who constituted over 80 
percent of the whole population. On the other hand, he adopted an aggressive trade policy 
moving from multilateralism to bilateralism. The failure in Seattle in 1999 to launch a new 
multilateral round and the stalemate of the subsequent Doha negotiation of the WTO further 
accelerated such a trade policy transformation (Bidhya, 2004).  
As will be discussed in the next section, this indicates a significant departure from the 
earlier emphasis on market-based liberalism to developmental liberalism. With a set of 
strong industrial policy goals, the Thaksin administration intended to play an important role 
in selecting FTA partners and defining the geography, scope and strength of bilateral FTAs. 
 
3.2 The Rise of Developmental Liberalism 
 
When Thaksin took office, Thailand’s trade policy was placed in a nut-cracking situation 
between global pressure for trade liberalization and domestic demand for protectionism. 
Although the Thaksin administration had a fear of exclusion from global market, it was 
difficult for Thaksin to accept neo-liberal pressure unconditionally. Among others, two co-
founding members of TRT party—Pansak Vinyaratn (former economic advisor) and Somkid 
Jatusripitak (former Finance and Commerce Minister)—persuaded Thaksin to change the 
trade policy platform from the previous market-based liberalism to finely-tuned government-
led developmental liberalism (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). 
As of 2001, Thai economy was increasingly losing its growth momentum across the 
board. As noted above, the real GDP growth rate decreased from 4.4 percent in 1999 to 2.2 
percent in 2001. The growth of manufacturing industry also slowed down from 11.9 percent 
to 1.4 percent during the same period. The speed of falling export goods was even more 
dramatic: from 12.1 percent in 1999 to 0.3 percent 2001 (NSO, 2007; IMF, 2013). In 
addition, the inflows of foreign investment into manufacturing sector fell from 6.5 percent of 
GDP in 1998 to 2.7 percent in 2001 (BOT, 2001). It was a worrisome development for Thai 
                                                          
7 The TRT party secured a near-majority of seats of the House of Representatives in 2001 and the 
absolute majority in 2005. 
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policymakers because manufactured goods—such as computers and their equipment, 
automobiles and auto parts, apparels, and plastic products—accounted for about 40 percent 
of Thailand’s total exports. 
The competitiveness of Thailand’s export sectors tumbled, losing many export markets. 
There was a growing perception in the policy circle that Thai economy was sandwiched 
between the lower-wage countries such as China, India and Vietnam and innovative newly 
industrialized countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. For example, the 
average labor cost of simple production-level worker in manufacturing industry was almost 
five times higher than that of Vietnam in 2001 (Kang, 2002). Vietnam competed with 
Thailand in Thailand’s top five export markets for Thailand: the U.S., Japan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and China, which together took up about 55 percent of Thailand’s total export. 
Consequently, its trade balance surplus shrank from 10.3 percent of GDP in 1998 to 2.6 
percent in 2001 (NSO, 2007). 
One of the urgent tasks of government intervention was to rehabilitate the 
competitiveness of export industries and to secure more accessibility to foreign markets, 
while pacifying the uncompetitive import substituting industries. Under the growing neo-
liberal pressure for market opening and the rise of China and India as manufacturing 
powerhouse, the Thaksin administration switched its trade policy platform from the 
GATT/WTO-based multilateralism to a preferential approach centered on bilateral FTAs. In 
a proactive and preemptive move, Thaksin proposed bilateral deals during his visit to Japan 
in November 2001 and the U.S. in December 2001 (Nation, 2001). The pursuit of 
developmental liberalism in trade policy was an inevitable choice for his administration to 
survive in a global stalemate of export markets and to maintain his domestic power base at 
the same time. 
Thaksin presented himself as a man who could get things done and was clearly inspired 
by the paternalist-authoritarian and developmental approach of Singapore’s former Prime 
Minister Lee Kwan Yew. He promised to solve the social problems of the rural communities, 
to protect the interest of domestic business, and to transform the Thai economy into an 
innovative, knowledge-based, and internationally competitive entity (Brown and Hewison, 
2005). Industrial upgrading was a catchphrase for his developmental liberalism. Thaksin 
thought that industrial upgrading through bilateral FTAs would offer Thailand a new leap 
forward to the first-tier country (Lauridsen, 2008). 
The Thai government began to consider FTAs as a policy option in the late 1990s. But it 
was only after Thaksin took office that FTAs became a serious policy bias (Nagai, 2002: 10; 
Sally, 2007). The turning point of Thaksin’s new trade policy came in late 2003 when the 
Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference in Mexico failed to produce any significant consensus 
on multilateral trade liberalization. Since its first bilateral FTA with India in 2003, the 
Thaksin administration signed a series of FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South 
Korea, and BIMSTEC as shown in Table 2. 
The highlight of Thaksin’s trade policy based on developmental liberalism was the 
initiation of Thailand-U.S. FTA (TUSFTA) negotiations in July 2004. Given that Singapore 
was the only country as of 2004 in East Asia which concluded a comprehensive FTA with 
the U.S., it was a bold move for a developing country like Thailand to start an FTA 
negotiation with the world’s largest economy. It was also a desperate move for Thaksin to 
reverse the declining trade surplus with the U.S.
8
 In 2001, the trade surplus with the U.S. was 
                                                          
8 In the previous five years, Thailand’s trade surplus with the U.S. dropped by 24 percent from 8.5 




Table 2. Thailand’s Multitrack FTA strategy 
 






India (3.18%, 2003, 2010)* ** 
China (15.51%, EHS since 2003)*** 
**** 




Australia (3.17% 2004, 2005) 
New Zealand (2.73% 2005, 2005) 
Japan (26.01%, 2005, 2007) 
U.S.(17.97%, pending since 2006) 
Peru (1.12%, pending since 2004) 
Bahrain (0.97%, pending since 2004) 
Chile (1.11%, under study) 
Czech (0.68%, under study) 
Croatia (0.59%, under study) 
Mexico (1.22%, under study) 
Pakistan (0.78%, under study) 
South Africa (0.49%, under study) 
Sri Lanka (0.98%, under study) 
ASEAN-Korea (10.93%, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 
2009)****** 
Source: IMF, The Direction of Trade Statistics, 2012. WTO RTA Database 2014 
* % scores indicate the value of bilateral trade as a portion of Thailand’s total trade (export + import) in 
2012.  
** The figures after the % scores indicate the year of signing the agreement and the year of the 
agreement coming into force. 
*** EHS: Early Harvest Scheme 
**** Including Hong Kong 
***** BIMSTEC: The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooper-
ation 
****** ASEAN has the following agreements with South Korea: framework agreement on com-
prehensive economic cooperation, signed in 2005; agreement on trade in goods, signed in 2006 and 
came into force in 2007; agreement on trade in services, signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009; 
agreement on investment, signed in 2009 and came into force in 2009. 
 
 
about 6 billion dollars, while Thailand’s total trade surplus was 3.5 billion dollars (MOC, 
2004). A successful conclusion of TUSFTA negotiations would be a last resort to the 
Thaksin government to revitalize Thai economy.  
In the early stage of TUSFTA negotiations, the Thaksin government stood on a solid 
political ground. Thaksin was the first elected Prime Minister to serve a full term until 
February 2005. Once again, he won a landslide victory in February 2005 general election, 
securing the absolute majority for his second term. The ruling TRT party gained 377 seats 
out of 500 in the Thai House of Representatives. The public support for the government 
remained high. Encouraged by election results, Thaksin reaffirmed his determination to the 
members of the National Assembly that he would push forward the developmentalist trade 
                                                          
billion dollars in 1999 to 6.5 billion in 2003 (MOC, 2004). 
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liberalization in every corner of industries and help upgrade Thai industries toward 
knowledge-based ones to catch up with other newly industrialized countries. As will be 
discussed in the next section, however, it was the beginning of the fall of Thaksin’s 
developmental liberalism.  
 
3.3 The Fall of Developmental Liberalism and the Rise of Sectoral Cronyism 
 
To facilitate his ambitious goal of industrial upgrading, Thaksin needed a faster trade 
policy-making process than before. Any dissident voices could not be tolerated. It was 
against this backdrop that Thaksin’s cohorts took over the direct control of trade policy 
machinery by bypassing the existing bureaucratic hierarchy.
9
 Thaksin and his cohorts wanted 
to recreate Thailand as economic powerhouse. The first half of his rule looked as if Thailand 
was turning to ‘Thailand, Inc.’ However, it ended up with ‘Thaksin, Inc.’ (Bidhya, 2004; 
Pasuk and Baker, 2009; Thitinan, 2011).  
Thaksin centralized the political and administrative structure, which was fragmented by 
political factions and bureaucratic departments.
10
 He made decisions lightning-fast and 
expected bureaucrats to carry them out quickly and unquestioningly (Baker and Pasuk, 2004). 
During the process of FTA negotiation with the U.S., Thaksin and his new appointees set up 
a new agency, the FTA Strategy and Negotiations Committee (FTA SNC). Before Thaksin 
came to power, the traditional control tower of trade policy was the International Economic 
Policy Coordination Committee (IEPCC). Led by the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the IEPCC coordinated conflicting views among 
government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA), the Ministry of Industry (MOI), and the like. But under Thaksin, the IEPCC and 
other government agencies were bypassed and Thaksin’s political appointees directly 
reported to the FTA SNC as well as Thaksin (Talerngsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). Under this 
new ad hoc structure, the Thaksin government unilaterally pushed ahead with TUSFTA 
negotiations with a tight deadline for completion. 
Unfortunately for Thaksin, the plan did not go as planned. It was increasingly becoming 
clear that FTAs were not a panacea for resolving Thailand’s economic woes: falling GDP 
growth rates, worsening trade balance, and declining industrial competitiveness. To make 
matters worse, the anti-Thaksin movement, fueled by anti-TUSFTA sentiments, began to 
spread widely across the country. Under the slogan of ‘knowledge-based economy’, Thaksin 
and his TRT party tried to cement their power base by pledging a lot of populist programs for  
 
                                                          
9  The key members and advisors in Thaksin’s policy inner sanctum were composed of many 
businessmen and neo-liberal scholars such as Somkid Jatusripitak, Pansak Vinyaratn and Suvit 
Maesincee. Somkid, the former Finance and Commerce Minister, was a co-founder of the Manager 
Media Group and a director of the Saha Pattanapibul Group, a major Thai consumer goods 
conglomerate. Pansak was a director of the Bangkok Bank Group and an editor of media tycoon 
Sondhi Limthongkun’s Asia Times. 
10 The centralization of his power was not confined to the cabinet, parliament and bureaucracy. Thaksin 
also moved to gain control over the armed forces, the police, the independent watchdog mechanisms 
(e.g. the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Elections Committee and the Constitutional 
Court), the media, non-governmental organizations and civil society. He looked on the country as a 
company and wanted to be CEO Thaksin (Lauridsen, 2008: 425). 
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Source: Author edited based on Sally (2007) and Thitinan (2011) 




the low-income rural and urban classes.
11 
But very few of their campaign pledges to support 
the poor were actually realized. 
The U.S. demanded Thailand to make comprehensive concessions, especially in market 
access, trade rules, and intellectual property rights (IPR), while showing a narrow bargaining 
zone in the areas of Thailand’s interest such as automobile and its parts, electronics, rice, 
sugar, ‘Mode IV’ service issues, agricultural subsidies, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
and anti-dumping duties.
12
 Thai media began to air nightmare stories that Thailand’s 
economic sovereignty was for sale and that the American multinational companies would 
take over the entire Thai economy.  
During the TUSFTA negotiation, Thailand was divided into proponents and opponents. 
Large agro-industries, high-tech corporations, and other export-oriented industries supported 
a free trade deal with the U.S. In contrast, small-scale farmers and fishermen, pharmaceutical 
industry, intellectual property industry, and service sector opposed the deal for fear of facing 
market opening pressure from the U.S. (Laudrisen, 2008). Opposition parties and NGOs such 
                                                          
11 For instance, Thaksin promised to protect the poor and industries that would be damaged by FTAs 
through subsidies, debt redemption postponement, trade adjustment assistance, customs refund, and 
the like (Kang, 2002). 
12 The U.S. pushed Thailand to open its market wider in the sectors of agriculture, healthcare and 
services for U.S. multinationals. Aside from the investor-state dispute settlement, the U.S. also 
demanded the protection of intellectual property rights to be included in the deal. America’s demand 
list included: an extension of patent protection to 25 years (compared with 20 years in TRIPS), data-
exclusivity rights (to protect clinical trial data from being used by generic manufacturers) for several 
years after the expiry of patent protection and extension of copyright protection to 70 years (compared 





































 and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)
14
 effectively organized the 
anti-Thaksin and anti-TUSFTA movement. They called for Thaksin’s step-down. Many 
Thais turned their back against Thaksin and his government. The TUSFTA negotiation 
reached an impasse (Thitinan, 2011). 
Thaksin’s developmental liberalism also faced the backlash from the government 
bureaucracy. A CEO-turned-politician Thaksin neglected the voice of bureaucratic elites. 
Basically before Thaksin, the power of Ministers was relatively weak as compared to the 
director-general and director-level power. Traditionally, this bureaucratic structure gave 
trade officials at the executive level autonomy and authority (Lauridsen, 2008). However, 
Thaksin did not recognize such autonomy and authority. Instead of relying on the old 
bureaucratic establishment, he created new ministries and departments. He filled new 
positions with his cronies, while silencing his opponents ruthlessly. The increasing tension 
between trade technocrats and Thaksin’s cronies severely weakened the checks and balances 
system. With the conflict over the chain of command escalating, the negotiation capacities 
and skills accumulated from the trade negotiations during the previous two decades were not 
fully utilized. Effective policy coordination among different ministries and the office of the 
Prime Minister was not possible. As it turned out, developmental liberalism became 
unsustainable.  
The launch of TUSFTA negotiations marked the highest point of Thaksin’s develop-
mental liberalism. Yet, his new policy platform came to a sudden end as the negotiations 
with the U.S. made no progress. The once broad-based scope and strength of industrial 
policy became narrow and weak as the TUSFTA negotiations proceeded. Many in Thailand 
began to doubt whether or not TUSFTA would benefit Thailand, Inc. rather than Thaksin, 
Inc. Attention to developmental liberalism was now transferred to sectoral cronyism, which 
had been incubated in the patron-client nexus under Thaksin.
15
  
The so-called ‘patronage system’ allowed a rent-seeking behavior by Thaksin and his 
cronies within the inner circle. For instance, an auto parts firm, owned by the Minister of 
Transportation, Suriya Jeungrungruengkit, enjoyed a 75 percent increase in exports of auto 
parts to Australia during his tenure under Thaksin (Thitinan, 2011). Thaksin and his family 
were also involved in the corruption allegations. The Shinawatra family sold their entire 
stake in Shin Corporation to the Temasek Holdings on January 2006 during the TUSFTA 
negotiation. The Shinawatra and Damapong families netted about 73 billion baht (about 1.88 
billion dollars) from the sale, using a regulation that made individuals who sell shares on the 
stock exchange exempt from capital gains tax. The deal made Thaksin the target of 
accusations of corruption and selling an asset of national importance to a foreign entity.
16
 
                                                          
13 The FTA Watch was an umbrella organization of 17 NGOs that collectively formed a powerful anti-
Thaksin group. It was the leading group against the Thailand-US FTA negotiations, including the 6th 
bargaining event at Chiang Mai in January 2006. Its activists and proponents ultimately became potent 
political actors who played a crucial role in laying the conditions that led to Thaksin’s downfall 
(Theerada, 2007; Thitinan, 2011). 
14 PAD consisted of both working and middle class Bangkokians, academics, and students. 
15 Thaksin created six new ministries and seventeen departments for his patronage politics by making 
more senior government positions available for his supporters. Thaksin appointed some of his leading 
cabinet members who hailed from the country’s largest agro-industry conglomerate and a major auto-
parts business group (Luaridsen, 2008). 
16 In 2008 Thaksin was sentenced to two years imprisonment in absentia over a corrupt land deal. That 




The TUSFTA, had it been signed during Thaksin’s term, would have been the most 
comprehensive FTA in East Asia ahead of South Korea’s deal with the U.S. in 2007. But his 
attempt ended up with a failure as he was forced to resign himself by a military coup that 
took place on September 19, 2006, only eight months after the TUSFTA deal came to a 
standstill. The root cause of failure of the Thaksin administration’s trade policy transition 
into developmental liberalism via FTAs was mainly caused by the failure in embedding the 
new policy idea into the social fabric while institutionalizing the trade policy-making 
processes. On the one hand, the centralization of political power made Thaksin stay in power 
for a long period and allowed him to pursue Thaksinomics in light of developmental 
liberalism. On the other hand, the privatization of decision-making power eventually led to 
the rise of sectoral cronyism, departing from his grand but false promise of transforming 
Thai economy into a knowledge-based one. 
 
 





4.1 The Fall of Developmental Mercantilism 
 
At the end of 2011, South Korea became the ninth country to join the ‘one-trillion-dollar 
trading club’, departing from the ranks of newly industrializing economies to join the ranks 
of trade giants. After reaching the $100 million mark in 1964, South Korea’s exports grew 
more than five thousand times in a matter of 50 years, making it the seventh-largest 
exporting country in the world (Koo, 2013: 95).  
The story of South Korea is a good example of developmental mercantilism.
18
 Its 
economic development model has often been characterized as export-oriented industry-
alization (EOI). To a large extent, however, South Korea also adopted an import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) to protect internally uncompetitive sectors. With its mixed, 
mercantilist strategy, South Korea has gained significantly from the multilateral trading 
regime of the GATT/WTO. Under the auspices of America’s Cold War strategy, South 
Korea benefited from the export market provided by the GATT/WTO while claiming 
‘developing country’ status in the GATT/WTO on various occasions.  
South Korea’s developmental mercantilism traces back to the early 1960s under President 
Park Chung-hee who in May 1961 overthrew the fledgling democratic regime that had 
replaced Syngman Rhee’s in the previous year. Following in the footsteps of the Japanese 
developmental model, Park’s active promotion of the export sector allowed his once 
reclusive country to aggressively join the global market. South Korea’s full integration into 
the world trading system was not a matter of choice but of survival. The institutional 
marriage of developmentalism and mercantilism quickly spread throughout the country, 
brokered by the social embeddedness of industrial policies (Koo, 2013: 96-97; Lee, 2012).  
The role played by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) was most notable. The EPB was 
                                                          
made him the first Thai politician to be convicted for corruption committed during prime ministership. 
17 This section builds upon and extends the first author’s earlier work on this subject as noted in the 
bibliography. 
18  For more discussions about South Korea’s developmental state, see Amsden (1989) and Woo-
Cumings (1999). 
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created in 1961 to conduct the military government’s strong commitment to economic 
development. It took over the functions of comprehensive development planning and foreign 
cooperation from the Ministry of Construction. It also absorbed the Bureau of Budget from 
the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Statistics from the Ministry of Home Affairs to 
ensure the effective implementation of the development programs. The institutional 
autonomy of the EPB made the agency possess a broad and long-term perspective, while 
enjoying a high degree of flexibility in making economic policy choices. This turned out to 
be crucial in steering South Korea’s economic development in the direction deemed most 
desirable (Choi, 2013: 32-33).  
As a result, South Korea’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 8.8 percent during the 
period 1965-79 while its international trade increased almost sixtyfold for the same period. 
South Korea’s total trade as a share of GDP rose over 50 percent for the first time in 1973. 
President Park’s authoritarian successors, Chun Doo-hwan (1981-88) and Roh Tae-woo 
(1988-93), continued with the developmental mercantilist strategy. During this period, South 
Korea’s GDP expanded more than four times from US$71.5 billion in 1981 to US$329.9 in 
1992 (Koo, 2013: 99-102).  
South Korea’s developmentalist trade policy provided minimum safeguards for 
uncompetitive import-competing sectors by instituting multilayered trade barriers. During 
the Uruguay Round (UR) of trade talks, for instance, the South Korean government made 
desperate efforts to protect rice and other agricultural and fishery products. Although South 
Korea had to agree to open its agricultural market under the UR agreement, its sensitive 




For the past two decades, however, South Korea’s trade policy platform has been 
transformed significantly thanks to globalization. The outbreak of the AFC shattered the 
illusion of South Korea’s unstoppable economic growth. In addition, South Korea’s top 
policymakers began to recognize that the mediocre performance of the WTO and increasing 
competition in its traditional export markets could hurt export-dependent South Korea 
(Cheong, 1999; Sohn, 2001). It became clear that developmental mercantilism alone was not 
able to cope with the unprecedented economic hardships.  
In response to the financial and economic turmoil, the Kim Dae-jung government (1998-
2003) implemented the so-called ‘IMF reforms’, which significantly changed South Korea’s 
earlier developmentalist path. His reform efforts led to the steady demise of the symbiotic 
relationship between government and business as symbolized by ‘Korea, Inc.’ (Lee and Han, 
2006). Even with changes, however, the reform process reflected the legacies of the 
developmental state, with the state still playing an important role in planning, implementing, 
and sustaining economic reforms (Koo, 2010: 111). 
In spite of initial opposition from the political and bureaucratic establishment, the Kim’s 
administration was more willing than any other previous administrations to promote 
competition by applying market discipline to various sectors of the economy. Another 
development was that market entry and exit became much easier during his presidency. Kim 
also took the initiative in shifting South Korea’s trade policy away from its earlier focus on 
access to the U.S. market through global multilateralism and the protection of uncompetitive 
                                                          
19 South Korea has been allowed to gradually increase its rice import quotas—instead of fully opening 
its rice market—under an agreement with the WTO. The deal expired at the end of 2014 and the South 
Korean government will have to scrap rice-import caps from 2015. 




domestic industries (Koo, 2009: 186-88). The Kim administration attempted to use foreign 
competitive pressure to enhance domestic efficiency as illustrated by the departure from its 
traditional mercantilist policy toward an active pursuit of FTAs. 
At first, South Korea was a newcomer in a world of FTA negotiations and had difficulty 
in choosing its FTA partners. The Kim government contacted a number of countries, but 
only a few of them showed explicit interest. In November 1998, the government’s Inter-
Ministerial Trade Policy Coordination Committee announced that South Korea would start 
FTA negotiations with Chile, mainly because of that country’s complementary industrial 
structure and the potentially low level of threat to South Korea’s agriculture due to the 
seasonal differences. For South Korea, Chile’s experience in FTA negotiations was an 
additional attraction. Subsequent FTA partners were to be selected from a list of small and 
medium-sized countries (Park and Koo, 2007: 266-67; Sohn, 2001). The two countries 
signed the first cross-Pacific FTA in February 2003.  
As seen in the case of Thailand, the structural changes that followed the AFC contributed 
significantly to a growing belief that bilateral liberalization was not only complementary to 
multilateral liberalism but also a crucial element of economic survival. The crisis effectively 
gave the South Korean government broad public tolerance for executive initiative for a more 
liberal trade policy. The economic crisis muted the country’s once rigid protectionist voices 
in favor of liberal economic policy reform (Koo, 2010; Mo, 1999; Mo and Moon, 2003).
20
 
Kim’s reform ushered in an irreversible transformation of South Korea’s trade policy 
paradigm. Although the link between FTAs and domestic reforms was not clearly defined, 
Kim’s FTA policy reflected his liberal policy ideas. Ironically, such a liberal shift ultimately 
intended to resuscitate South Korea’s developmentalism focused on export industries. The 
Kim Dae-jung administration wanted to ensure the survival of most of South Korea’s major 
export firms, but at the same time clearly understood that post-crisis external conditions 
would not allow South Korea to free-ride on others’ market any longer, as it did under the 
auspices of the GATT/WTO (Koo, 2010: 111). 
 
4.2 The Rise of Developmental Liberalism 
 
The policy shift toward FTAs under President Kim marked a dramatic shift from a 
developmental mercantilist policy platform. The liberal posture was in clear contrast with 
generally protectionist attitudes held by most previous administrations in relation to market 
opening. President Kim Dae-jung obviously was not the first South Korean leader to talk 
about the country’s need for structural reform. Yet, the Kim administration stood out, among 
other things, for its greater willingness to introduce market discipline to various sectors of 
the economy that were traditionally protected from competition. 
As his successor, President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) entered office in 2003 and 
completed the roadmap for FTAs and detailed action plans for its multi-track FTA strategy 
(MOFAT, 2006; Lee, 2006). In contrast to its rather peripheral status on Kim’s economic and 
                                                          
20 The domestic political structure facilitated South Korea’s liberal turn. In the immediate aftermath of 
the AFC, South Korea’s protectionist veto players, such as labor unions and farmers’ organizations, 
were temporarily disorganized due to President Kim’s liberal reform and the austerity program 
imposed by the IMF (Chang, 2007: 69). Although some farmers’ groups and labor unions remained 
militant, their political influence weakened, as both their absolute and relative shares in the economy 
diminished (Koo, 2010). 
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strategic agenda, trade liberalization through FTAs became a serious policy bias of the Roh 
administration. Roh further expanded South Korea’s FTA strategy by mobilizing 
comprehensive side payments to pacify those groups which would be negatively affected by 
trade liberalization.  
At the turn of the new millennium, there was a growing concern in South Korea’s 
manufacturing sector that its trade deficit would be enlarged as the Korean won (KRW) had 
been steadily appreciating since 2001, undermining South Korean manufacturers’ price 
competitiveness in the global market. Not only chaebols but also small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) began to move their production facilities abroad to make up for the 
disadvantage. Securing export markets through FTAs thus became a top priority to the Roh 
administration. The Blue House and many trade officials regarded the sacrifice of less 
competitive sectors such as agriculture to be necessary for broader national interests (Koo 
and Jho, 2013). 
This trend took its most pronounced form when South Korea concluded an FTA with the 
U.S. in 2007.
21
 The South Korea-U.S. FTA (KORUS FTA) represents the ever most 
important FTA for South Korea and one of the most commercially significant FTAs for the 
U.S. after the conclusion of North American free trade agreement (NAFTA) in 1993. The 
negotiation process was not an easy one. Since the signing of the agreement, the two 
countries had to struggle with even tougher legislative ratification processes. On 3 December 
2010, additional negotiations were finally concluded. On October 12, 2011, the US Congress 
passed the agreement. About a month later after the congressional move, the National 
Assembly of South Korea also ratified the bilateral trade deal, thus finally ending a four-and-
a-half year long legislative battle on both sides of the Pacific (Koo and Jho, 2013: 66; Sohn 
and Koo, 2011: 434). 
The KORUS FTA clearly illustrates that the fear of exclusion from the U.S. market 
played a significant role in South Korea’s decision to start FTA negotiations with the 
economic superpower despite serious concerns about that country’s dominant position in the 
global economy. Initially, the Roh administration’s move toward the KORUS FTA came as a 
surprise because, according to its original FTA road map, a comprehensive FTA with a large 
economy like the U.S. was a long-term goal, while deals with light trading partners such as 
Chile, Mexico, and Canada had top priority (Koo, 2009; Koo and Jho, 2013; Sohn and Koo, 
2011).  
This change in the sequence of FTA partner selection meant an implicit but noticeable 
emphasis on strategic value in South Korea’s FTA equations (Lee and Moon, 2008). 
Certainly, South Korea expected huge economic gains from an FTA with the U.S. South 
Korea’s top policy elites believed that an FTA with the U.S. would accelerate South Korea’s 
market-oriented reform process and upgrade its economy, thus helping overcome the likely 
scenario of a South Korea ‘sandwiched’ between Japan and China (Sohn, 2006). On this 
score, South Korea’s then trade minister, Kim Hyun-chong, was particularly enthusiastic. He 
made it no secret that the KORUS FTA would be an effective way to transform the structure 
of the Korean economy, departing from its replication of the Japanese developmental model 
                                                          
21 After eight intensive rounds of negotiations since June 2006, South Korea and the U.S. concluded a 
landmark deal on April 1, 2007 and signed it on June 30, 2007. Prior to the U.S., Japan was a natural 
candidate for South Korea’s FTA partner. The two countries had held six rounds of negotiations since 
December 2003 until they came to a halt in November 2004 due to disagreements on the speed and 
coverage of bilateral trade liberalization (Park and Koo, 2007: 263). 




and adopting an American-style liberal economy.
22
 
President Roh became a champion of the FTA as a diplomatic tool to strengthen strategic 
ties with the U.S. He supported Minister Kim’s ambitious idea at the cost of his loyal 
constituents, including progressive civil groups, labor unions, and farmer groups. He clearly 
understood the strategic utility of the FTA. Equally important was the fact that he became a 
true believer in free trade and market opening as a key to economic growth.
23
 He tried to 
instill the market discipline to the sectors that had been traditionally sealed off from 
competition based on concerns that foreign competition may hamper the proper provision of 
goods and services in question. Departing from the Japanese ‘flying geese’ model of 
development, Roh argued, South Korea should find its economic future in high-tech and 
service industries, which would gain a growth opportunity in an expanded U.S. market (Sohn, 
2014).  
Why and how did South Korea succeed in sealing a deal with the U.S. whereas Thailand 
failed to do so despite its first mover’s advantage? In the past, South Korean trade 
negotiators’ autonomy was institutionally weak at the domestic level and their policy ideas 
were overshadowed by mercantilism. By contrast, the empowerment of the Office of the 
Minister for Trade (OMT) in South Korea after 2004 institutionally strengthened chief 
negotiators’ autonomy vis-à-vis trade negotiations.
24
 Such an increased autonomy, combined 
with chief negotiators’ free-trade ideas as well as their own institutional interests, allowed 
the OMT to pursue proactive and comprehensive trade deals with major trading partners 
(Koo and Jho, 2013: 67-68). 
As a champion of liberal economic ideas, the OMT was relatively insulated from pressure 
from special interest groups, which in turn prevents it from obtaining sufficient public 
support for FTAs.
25
 Its decision to pursue an FTA with the U.S. initially prompted a 
mercantilist outcry that it would serve only America’s neoliberal interests.
26
 In contrast to 
their temporary disorganization during the Kim Dae-jung period, traditional protectionist 
                                                          
22 Interview with Minister Kim Hyun-chong, May 2009, quoted in Sohn and Koo (2011). 
23 Interview with Minister Kim Hyun-chong, May 2009, quoted in Sohn and Koo (2011). 
24 The 1998 government organization reforms established the OMT under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade to facilitate negotiations of trade liberalization. Institutionally, the empowerment of 
the OMT demonstrated renewed enthusiasm and commitment under Roh as the once beleaguered 
institution took firm root within the government with its mandate to initiate and negotiate FTAs. 
However, the trade negotiation authority is now delegated to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy as a result of the 2013 government organizational reform. 
25 OMT’s neoliberal policy orientation was further highlighted by the appointment of its third trade 
minister, Kim Hyun-chong, in July 2004, as well as the promotion of its first trade minister, Han Duk-
soo (1998-2004), to deputy prime minister and minister of finance and economy. For the critics of 
neoliberal economic policy as well as hardcore Korean nationalists, Trade Minister Kim was a bad 
choice, not only because he advocated neoliberal economic policies, but also because he grew up in 
the U.S. and was trained there as a lawyer, which allegedly undermined his nationalist credentials 
(Koo, 2009: 189). 
26  South Korea’s uncompetitive sectors felt more victimized by the Roh administration’s FTA 
initiatives with strong liberal overtones. For those skeptics, Roh’s effort to restructure the Korean 
economy by inviting external pressure, the FTAs, would only worsen the economic polarization in 
South Korea, rather than providing an opportunity to upgrade its economy to a more advanced level 
(Lee, 2006: 6). 
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groups under Roh Moo-hyun recovered from the shadow of financial crisis and began to 
work closely with anti-globalization NGOs and anti-capital labor unions. Some radicals even 
dubbed the implicit linkage of the KORUS FTA to neoliberal reforms ‘the second IMF-
imposed liberalization’ (National Emergency Conference, 2007; quoted in Koo, 2010: 114). 
Nevertheless, the top-down nature of South Korea’s FTA initiative as promoted by the 
OMT indicates that its FTA strategy was inherently developmentalist in tone and scope. The 
Roh government argued that an FTA with the U.S. would most likely benefit its competitive 
sectors, such as automobiles and textiles, while a variety of side-payments—instead of blind 
protectionism—would effectively mitigate the losses resulting from greater trade openness.
27
 
Roh’s FTA initiative can thus be characterized as a tool for developmental liberalism rather 
than developmental mercantilism or neoliberalism (Koo, 2010: 108). 
The conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, which took office in February 2008, 
made a dramatic break with the progressive policies of the preceding 10 years. The FTA 
strategy was one of the few areas in which the Lee administration followed in the footsteps 
of its predecessors. Despite huge political adjustment costs due to the U.S. beef imports 
controversy in the first half of 2008, the Lee administration remained committed to the 
multitrack FTA strategy originally designed by the Roh administration.
28
 The conclusion of 
FTA deals with major economies like India and the EU during Lee’s presidency proved the 
point. At the ceremony for the conclusion of Korea-EU FTA negotiations on July 13, 2009, 
President Lee expressed his hope and belief that South Korea’s lagging service industry 
would benefit from freer trade with the EU as a powerhouse of the global service industry, 
accounting for 46.5 percent of global trade in services (Koo, 2010: 117). 
Under these circumstances, the speed and scope of South Korea’s FTA initiative has been 
truly remarkable (see Table 3). The global economic crisis in 2008 has not reduced the speed 
and scope of South Korea’s FTA initiative. South Korea has thus far concluded fourteen 
FTAs—with Chile, Singapore, the European Free Trade Association, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the U.S., India, Peru, the European Union (EU), Turkey,  
                                                          
27 With its market opening commitments, the Roh administration provided generous side payments in 
order to cushion citizens from the vagaries of the international economy in return for public support 
for openness. For instance, the ratification of the Korea-Chile FTA in February 2004 was followed by 
the passage of a special law designed to make up for its potential financial damage to the farming and 
fishing industries. Despite criticism of the government’s excessive financial commitment to declining 
sectors, over $80 billion of public and private funds were earmarked for farming and fishing rescue 
programs over a 10-year period. Other examples include a series of pledged side payments in the form 
of government subsidies and grants-in-aid during the KORUS FTA negotiations. The Roh government 
also committed itself to provide cash allowances for seven years to compensate for up to 85 percent of 
income losses of farmers and fishermen once the KORUS FTA goes into effect (Koo, 2010: 114-15). 
28 In April 2008, the Lee administration announced that it would lift the ban on the importation of 
American beef, supposedly the final barrier to the ratification of the KORUS FTA. Imports of 
American beef had been virtually halted since 2003 after the detection of mad cow disease in the 
United States. The Bush administration claimed that it had resolved the disease problem and that U.S. 
beef was now safe to consume. Key U.S. lawmakers signaled that ratification of the KORUS FTA 
thus hinged on the lifting of the South Korean ban. The announcement that U.S. beef imports would 
resume, with some restrictions on the types of meat that would be allowed, sparked a series of mass 
demonstrations across South Korea. This seriously damaged the legitimacy of the then new Lee 
administration (Hundt, 2008: 508-09). 




Table 3. South Korea’s Multi-track FTA strategy 
 






Japan (10.81%, negotiation suspended 
since 2004)* ** 
China (24.85%, 2014, pending)*** 




Chile (0.88%, 2003, 2004) 
Singapore (3.51%, 2005, 2006)  
U.S. (9.81%, 2007, 2011)  
India (1.50%, 2009, 2010) 
Peru (0.20%, 2011, 2011) 
Turkey (0.47%, 2012, 2012) 
Colombia (0.17%, 2013, pending) 
Australia (2.61%, 2014, pending) 
Canada (1.13%, 2014, pending)  
New Zealand (0.23%, 2014, pending) 
Mexico (1.14%, negotiation since 2006)  
South Africa (0.47%, under study)  
Russia (2.28%, under study) 
Israel (0.22%, under study) 
Vietnam (0.96%, under study) 
EFTA (0.64%, 2005, 2006)  
ASEAN (10.93%, 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2009)**** 
EU (11.06%, 2010, 2011)  
GCC (9.60%, negotiation 
since 2008) 
Mercosur (1.40%, under 
study)  
Source: IMF, The Direction of Trade Statistics, 2012. 
* % scores indicate the value of bilateral trade as a portion of South Korea’s total trade (export + 
import) in 2011. 
** The figures after the % scores indicate the year of signing the agreement and the year of the 
agreement coming into force. 
*** Including Hong Kong 
**** Korea has the following agreements with ASEAN: framework agreement on comprehensive 
economic cooperation, signed in 2005; agreement on trade in goods, signed in 2006 and came into 
force in 2007; agreement on trade in services, signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009; agreement 
on investment, signed in 2009 and came into force in 2009. 
 
 
Colombia, Australia, Canada, China and New Zealand. If all of these agreements were fully 
implemented, over 67 percent of South Korea’s total trade would be covered by bilateral or 
minilateral FTAs. South Korea has also been negotiating FTAs with Japan, Mexico, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Russia, and Vietnam. In addition, feasibility studies are under way 
with South Africa, MERCOSUR, Israel, Malaysia, and many other countries.
29
 
Such a policy shift nicely captures a different kind of dualism—that is, proactivism when 
selecting FTA partners and embeddedness when garnering domestic political support. On the 
one hand, the OMT institutionalized the idea of pursuing economic reforms and cementing 
strategic partnerships through FTAs. On the other hand, the success of its proactive 
negotiations has been achieved by social embeddedness consisting of generous compensation 
packages to support those who suffer damages from FTAs. The combination of market 
                                                          
29  South Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (http://motie.go.kr/motie/py/ce/fta/ 
ftaconcept.jsp) 
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discipline and social embeddedness of government intervention allowed South Korea’s trade 
elites to get around fierce opposition from the political and bureaucratic establishment who 
used to benefit from heavily protected domestic market. As such, the most important feature 
of South Korea’s FTA strategy is that the reform process continues to reflect the legacies of 
the developmental state, with the state still playing an important role in planning, 
implementing, and sustaining economic reform (Koo, 2010: 118). 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The developmentalist trade policy is not passé. In the aftermath of the AFC and the GFC, 
it has shown its institutional resilience as illustrated by the rise of state intervention across 
the world. Not only East Asian governments but also many Western governments adopted 
industrial policies to promote and protect their industries.  
This study began with an observation that the developmentalist trade policy has varied 
over time and space. East Asia is not an exception. Thailand and South Korea are two good 
examples of the varieties of developmentalist trade policy. For a more systematic comparison 
of their developmentalist trade policy, this study categorizes four different types of nexus 
between the scope of trade liberalization and industrial policy purposes: (1) developmental 
mercantilism/sectoralism; (2) market-based sectoralism or sectoral cronyism; (3) 
developmental liberalism; and (4) market-based liberalism.  
The main findings of this study is two-fold: (1) Thailand’s developmentalist trade policy 
has moved from developmental liberalism to sectoral cronyism, departing from its earlier 
focus on market-based liberalism centered on the multilateral trading regime of the 
GATT/WTO; and (2) South Korea’s developmentalist trade policy has moved from 
developmental mercantilism to developmental liberalism by successfully institutionalizing 
the trade liberalization-industrial goal nexus within the government bureaucracy and the 
social fabric as well. 
Having enjoyed economic booms for over two decades under the auspices of the 
GATT/WTO multilateralism, Thailand found itself in the middle of financial crisis in the late 
1990s and again under the nut-cracking situation among catch-up economies at the turn of 
the new millennium. Thaksin came to Prime Minister’s office in early 2001 with a vision to 
transform Thailand into a more advanced, knowledge-based economy by way of industrial 
upgrading. He adopted a developmental-liberal strategy, which enshrined in the departure 
from Thailand’s traditional focus on GATT/WTO-based multilateralism to bilateral 
preferential agreements. Initially, the Thaksin administration had a clear set of industrial 
policy goals to promote its besieged manufacturing sectors by securing more export markets 
abroad through FTAs. However, Thaksin’s trade policy offensive, having held much promise 
at first, ultimately fell victim to cronyism. Aside from too many FTA negotiations lining up 
with unrealistically tight deadlines, Thaksin’s CEO-style leadership soon invited serious 
challenges from the civil groups as well as the government bureaucracy. He failed to 
institutionalize his new trade policy ideas. Even worse, his political cronies began to seek 
economic rents, thus degrading developmental liberalism into sectoral cronyism.  
In contrast, South Korea used to be notorious for its developmental mercantilism: 
promoting export industries and protecting import-competing industries through various 
forms of government intervention. However, it successfully transformed its once-mercantilist 
trade policy platform into a developmental-liberal one by embedding industrial policy goals 




into its business and social fabric. The role of the Office of the Minister for Trade was 
crucial in this regard. The OMT carefully coordinated decision-making processes while other 
related government agencies pacified otherwise protectionist interests by providing generous 
compensations. Although the OMT has been dissolved, South Korea’s developmental 
liberalism will be sustained because of its institutional embeddedness.  
The comparative analysis of Thailand and South Korea leads to three general conclusions.  
First, both countries’ dramatic embrace of FTAs has been driven by a top-down initiative 
by state elites rather than by a bottom-up demand from businesses. This is a developmental 
state characteristic. Both of them represent a notable policy departure in East Asia from the 
exclusive focus on the GATT/WTO toward government-led trade liberalization through 
FTAs. This is a liberal characteristic.  
Second, their particular types of policy platform have varied not only over time but also 
over space. This means that there are the varieties of East Asian developmentalist trade 
policy rather than a single ideal type.  
And third, the contrast between Thailand’s sectoral cronyism and South Korea’s 
developmental liberalism highlights the significance of institutions in promoting industrial 
policy goals and sustaining liberal trade policy at the same time. Although the right balance 
between embeddedness and liberal policy may continue to evolve, this study shows that 
developmental liberalism can be a prominent feature of East Asia’s new developmentalist 
trade policy. 
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